Abstract A growing number of scholars have come to view Confucians and other Chinese thinkers as virtue ethicists. Other scholars, though, have challenged this classification. This essay discusses some of the problems that surround this debate, points out shortcomings in some of the criticisms that have been made, and offers suggestions about how best to develop a productive discussion about the issue.
Introduction
Recent decades have seen a significant increase in scholarly discussions about virtue, especially under the heading of "virtue ethics" and "virtue epistemology." This trend has led some to speak of an ongoing or upcoming "virtue turn" 1 in contemporary philosophy as an analogue to the "linguistic turn" that is often said to have taken place among Anglo-American philosophers in the first half of the 20th century. The trend is not confined just to philosophy, though, but is observable in other areas, such as religious studies, and it has extended into scholarly discussions of the Chinese tradition as well, where it has drawn the attention of historians and sinologists. My purpose in this essay is to discuss how to describe and evaluate this "virtue turn" in relation to the Dao (2015 ) 14:331-353 DOI 10.1007 Chinese tradition, and more specifically one aspect of it, namely the categorization of Confucian and other Chinese views as "virtue ethics," 2 which is a position that has been taken by a growing number of scholars, but which has also been subjected to criticism. Although my own intellectual sympathies lie more with those who treat Confucianism and other Chinese views as forms of virtue ethics, 3 here I will not attempt to offer anything even approaching a full defense of such a view, for reasons that will become apparent in what follows. Rather, what I want to argue is that, at the present time, the complexities involved in the matter do not permit any general judgments about the value of categorizing Chinese thought in this way, and the same applies to any general judgments about the value of the "virtue turn" as it relates to the Chinese tradition.
4 Given the current situation, there is need for much further, careful study before such judgments can be made, and so my primary aim on this occasion is to offer suggestions to those on both sides of the debates about these issues, but especially to those who are inclined to be critical or skeptical about the "virtue turn" as it pertains to Chinese thought, with the hopes of steering future scholarly work away from what I consider to be misguided discussions and toward more productive exchanges.
On Identifying and Evaluating a "Virtue Turn" in the Chinese Tradition
Before approaching the issue of evaluation, we should try to get clear about the ways in which one might talk about the "virtue turn" and "virtue ethics" in relation to the Chinese tradition. In order to highlight the complexities of that issue, I want to start by discussing "virtue ethics" and the "virtue turn" in relation to the Western tradition, especially because the complications that arise in applying those terms even to the Western tradition-where they are, in a sense, most likely to be at home-can easily be overlooked (and, in my view, have been overlooked by a number of those who criticize the discussion of Chinese texts in such terms).
In particular, there is a story one often hears about the history of virtue ethics in the West. According to this story, virtue ethics waxed and waned. It first flourished during the Greco-Roman period, with Aristotle as its most outstanding proponent. It then persisted through many centuries of the Christian era and became at least partly melded with Christian ethics due to the work of Aquinas and others who sought to combine Aristotelian and Christian views. However, in the 18th and 19th centuries virtue ethics then fell into disfavor with the rise of Kantianism and Utilitarianism, but it was revived again in the latter half of the 20th century, spurred in large part by the writings of G. E. M. Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre. Since then, virtue ethics has been steadily
